A distributed binary hypothesis testing (HT) problem involving two parties, a remote observer and a detector, is studied. The remote observer has access to a discrete memoryless source, and communicates its observations to the detector via a rate-limited noiseless channel. The detector observes another discrete memoryless source, and performs a binary hypothesis test on the joint distribution of its own observations with those of the observer. While the goal of the observer is to maximize the type II error exponent of the test for a given type I error probability constraint, it also wants to keep a private part of its observations as oblivious to the detector as possible. Considering both equivocation and average distortion as possible measures of privacy, the trade-off between the communication rate from the observer to the detector, the type II error exponent, and privacy is studied.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data inference and privacy are often contradicting objectives. In many multi-agent system, each agent/user reveals information about its data to a remote service, application or authority, which in turn, provides certain utility to the users based on their data.
Many emerging networked systems can be thought of in this context, from social networks to smart grids and communication networks. While obtaining the promised utility is the main goal of the users, privacy of data that is shared is becoming increasingly important. Thus, it is critical that users reveal only the information relevant for obtaining the desired utility, while maximum possible privacy is retained for their sensitive information.
In distributed learning applications, typically the goal is to learn the joint probability distribution of data available at different locations. In some cases, there may be prior knowledge about the joint distribution, for example, that it belongs to a certain This work has been supported in part by the European Research Council Starting Grant project BEACON (grant agreement number 677854). A part of this work was presented at the IEEE Information theory Workshop (ITW), Guangzhou, 2018 [16] . arXiv:1807.02764v5 [cs.IT] 29 Aug 2019 set of known probability distributions. In such a scenario, the nodes communicate their observations to the detector, which then applies HT on the underlying joint distribution of the data based on its own observations and those received from other nodes. However, with the efficient data mining and machine learning algorithms available today, the detector can illegitimately infer some unintended private information from the data provided to it exclusively for HT purposes. Such threats are becoming increasingly imminent as large amounts of seemingly irrelevant yet sensitive data are collected from users, such as in medical research [1] , social networks [2] , online shopping [3] and smart grids [4] . Therefore, there is an inherent trade-off between the utility acquired by sharing data and the associated privacy leakage.
In this paper, we study distributed HT with a privacy constraint, in which, an observer communicates its observations to a detector over a noiseless rate-limited channel of rate R nats per observed sample. Using the data received from the observer, the detector performs binary HT on the joint distribution of its own observations and those of the observer. The performance of the HT is measured by the asymptotic exponential rate of decay of the type II error probability, known as the type II error exponent (or error-exponent henceforth), for a given constraint on the type I error probability (definitions will be given below).
While the goal is to maximize the performance of the HT, the observer also wants to maintain a certain level of privacy against the detector for some latent private data that is correlated with its observations. We are interested in characterizing the trade-off between the communication rate from the observer to the detector over the channel, error-exponent achieved by the HT and the amount of information leakage of private data. A special case of HT known as testing against conditional independence (TACI) will be of particular interest. In TACI, the detector tests whether its own observations are independent of those at the observer, conditioned on additional side information available at the detector.
Distributed HT without any privacy constraint has been studied extensively from an information theoretic perspective in the past, although many open problems remain. The fundamental results for this problem are first established in [5] , which includes a single-letter lower bound on the optimal error-exponent and a strong converse result which states that the optimal error-exponent is independent of the constraint on the type I error probability. Exact single-letter characterization of the optimal error-exponent for the testing against independence (TAI) problem, i.e., TACI with no side information at the detector, is also obtained. The lower bound established in [5] is further improved in [6] and [7] . Strong converse is studied in the context of complete data compression and zero-rate compression in [6] and [8] , respectively, where in the former, the observer communicates to the detector using a message set of size two, while in the latter using a message set whose size grows sub-exponentially with the number of observed samples. The TAI problem with multiple observers remains open (similar to several other distributed compression problems when a non-trivial fidelity criterion is involved); however, the optimal error-exponent is obtained in [9] when the sources observed at different observers follow a certain Markov relation. The scenario in which, in addition to HT, the detector is also interested in obtaining a reconstruction of the observer's source, is studied in [10] . The authors characterize the trade-off between the achievable error-exponent and the average distortion between the observer's observations and the detector's reconstruction. The TACI is first studied in [11] , where the optimality of a random binning based encoding scheme is shown. The optimal error-exponent for TACI over a noisy communication channel is established in [12] . Extension of this work to general HT over a noisy channel is considered in [13] , where lower bounds on the optimal error-exponent are obtained by using a separation based scheme and also using hybrid coding for the communication between the observer and the detector. The TACI with a single observer and multiple detectors is studied in [14] , where each detector tests for the conditional independence of its own observations from those of the observer. The general HT version of this problem over a noisy broadcast channel is explored in [15] , where the authors employ a combination of hybrid coding and unequal error protection scheme of [17] . While all the above works consider the asymmetric objective of maximizing the error-exponent under a constraint on the type I error probability, the trade-off between the exponential rate of decay of both the type I and type II error probabilities are also considered in [18] - [20] .
Data privacy has been a hot topic of research in the past decade, spanning across multiple disciplines in computer and computational sciences. Several practical schemes have been proposed that deal with the protection or violation of data privacy in different contexts, e.g., see [21] - [26] . More relevant for our work, HT under mutual information and maximal leakage privacy constraints have been studied in [27] and [28] , respectively, where the encoder uses a memoryless privacy mechanism to convey a noisy version of its observed data to the detector. The detector performs HT on the probability distribution of the observer's data, and the optimal privacy mechanism that maximizes the error-exponent while satisfying the privacy constraint is analyzed. Recently, a distributed version of this problem has been studied in [29] , where the encoder applies a privacy mechanism to its observed data prior to further coding for compression, and the goal at the detector is to perform a HT on the joint distribution of its own observations with those of the observer. In contrast with [27] , [28] and [29] , we study distributed HT with a privacy constraint, but without considering a separate privacy mechanism at the encoder. In Section II, we will further discuss the differences between the system model considered here and that of [29] .
It is important to note here that the data privacy problem is fundamentally different from that of data security against an eavesdropper or an adversary. In data security, sensitive data is to be protected against an external malicious agent distinct from the legitimate parties in the system. The techniques for guaranteeing data security usually involve either cryptographic methods in which the legitimate parties are assumed to have additional resources unavailable to the adversary (e.g., a shared private key) or the availability of better communication channel conditions (e.g., using wiretap codes). However, in data privacy problems, the sensitive data is to be protected from the same legitimate party that receives the messages and provides the utility; and hence, the above mentioned techniques for guaranteeing data security are not applicable. Another model frequently used in the context of information-theoretic security assumes the availability of different side-information at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper [30] , [31] . A distributed HT problem with security constraints formulated along these lines is studied in [32] , where the authors propose an inner bound on the rate-error exponent-equivocation trade-off. While our model is closely related to that in [32] when the side-information at the detector and eavesdropper coincide, there are some important differences which will be highlighted in Section II-C.
Many different privacy measures have been considered in the literature to quantify the amount of private information leakage, such as k-anonymity [33] , differential privacy [34] , mutual information leakage [35] - [37] , maximal leakage [38] , and total variation distance [39] to count a few; see [40] for a detailed survey. Among these, mutual information between the private and revealed information (or, equivalently, the equivocation of private information given the revealed information) is perhaps the most commonly used measure in the information theoretic studies of privacy. It is well known that a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee statistical independence between two random variables is to have zero mutual information between them. Furthermore, the average information leakage measured using an arbitrary privacy measure is upper bounded by a constant multiplicative factor of that measured by mutual information [36] . It is also shown in [35] that a differentially private scheme is not necessarily private when the information leakage is measured by mutual information. This is done by constructing an example that is differentially private, yet the mutual information leakage is arbitrarily high. Mutual information based measures have also been used in cryptographic security studies. For example, the notion of semantic security defined in [41] is shown to be equivalent to a measure based on mutual information in [42] . A rate-distortion approach to privacy is first explored by Yamamoto in [43] for a rate-constrained noiseless channel, where, in addition to a distortion constraint for legitimate data, a minimum distortion requirement is enforced for the private part. Recently, there have been several works that have used distortion as a security or privacy metric in several different contexts, such as side-information privacy in discriminatory lossy source coding [44] and rate distortion theory of secrecy systems [45] , [46] . Distortion based measures have also been considered in steganography, for instance, in the context of watermarking systems in the presence of an attacker [47] , [48] .
In such systems, the goal of the encoder is to embed the watermark within the host data (covertext) such that the distortion between the covertext and the watermarked version (stegotext) is below a certain threshold, while the aim of the attacker is to corrupt the stegotext to a permissible level of additional distortion such that correct decoding of the watermark is inhibited.
That is, low distortion on the stegotext is treated as "uncorrupted" data, while high distortion is considered to be corrupted data. In this paper, we will consider both equivocation and average distortion as measures of privacy. In [49] , error-exponent of a HT adversary is considered as a privacy measure. This can be considered as the opposite setting to ours, in the sense that, while the goal here is to increase the error-exponent under a privacy leakage constraint, the goal in [49] is to reduce the error-exponent under a constraint on possible transformations that can be applied on the data.
The amount of private information leakage that can be tolerated depends on the specific application at hand. While it may be possible to tolerate a moderate amount of information leakage in applications like online shopping or social networks, it may no longer be the case in matters related to information sharing among government agencies or corporations. While it is obvious that maximum privacy can be attained by revealing no information, this typically comes at the cost of zero utility.
On the other hand, maximum utility can be achieved by revealing all the information, but at the cost of minimum privacy.
Characterizing the optimal trade-off between the utility and the minimum privacy leakage between these two extremes is a fundamental and challenging research problem.
Main Contributions
The main contributions of this work are as follows.
(i) In Section III, Theorem 8 (resp. Theorem 9), we establish a single-letter inner bound on the rate-error exponentequivocation (resp. rate-error exponent-distortion) trade-off for distributed HT with a privacy constraint. The distortion and equivocation privacy constraints we consider, that is given in (6) and (7) , respectively, are slightly stronger than what is usually considered in the literature (stated in (8) and (9), respectively).
(ii) Exact characterizations are obtained for some important special cases in Section IV. More specifically, a single-letter characterization of the optimal rate-error exponent-equivocation (resp. rate-error exponent-distortion) trade-off is established for: a) TACI with a privacy constraint (for vanishing type I error probability constraint) in Section IV-A, Proposition 10 (resp. Proposition 11), b) distributed HT with a privacy constraint for zero-rate compression (R = 0) in Section IV-B, Proposition 15 (resp. Proposition 14).
Since the optimal trade-offs in Propositions 14 and 15 are independent of the constraint on the type I error probability, they are strong converse results in the context of HT.
(iii) Finally, in Section V, we provide a counterexample showing that for positive rate R > 0, the strong converse result does not hold in general for TAI with a privacy constraint.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Basic notations are introduced in Section II-A. The problem formulation and associated definitions are given in Section II-B. Main results are presented in Sections III to V. The proofs of the results are presented either in the Appendix or immediately after the statement of the result. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper with some open problems for future research.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notations
All the random variables (r.v.'s) considered in this paper are discrete with finite support unless specified otherwise. We denote r.v.'s and their realizations by upper and lower case letters (e.g., X and x), respectively. Sets are denoted by calligraphic letters, e.g., the alphabet of a r.v. X is denoted by X . The set of all probability distributions with support X is denoted by P X . A sequence of r.v.'s X 1 , . . . , X n will be denoted by X n . Following the notation in [50] , for a probability distribution P X on r.v. X, T m P X and T m [P X ] δ (or T m [X] δ ) denote the set of sequences x m ∈ X m of type P X and the set of P X -typical (strongly) sequences, respectively. The set of all possible types of sequences of length m with alphabet X is denoted by T m X , and ∪ m∈Z + T m X is denoted by T X . Similar notations apply for pairs and other larger combinations of r.v.'s, e.g.,
The standard information theoretic quantities like Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between distributions P X and Q X , the entropy of X with distribution P X , the conditional entropy of X given Y , and the mutual information between X and Y with joint distribution P XY , are denoted by D(P X ||Q X ), H P X (X), H P XY (X|Y ) and I P XY ( 
where PXỸ denotes the joint type of (x m , y m ), and := represents equality by definition. 1 denotes the indicator function.
X − Y − Z denotes a Markov chain between the r.v.'s X, Y and Z, while X ⊥ Y denotes statistical independence of X and Y .
(n) − − → denotes asymptotic limit with respect to n, e.g., a n (n) − − → 0 means that the sequence a n tends to zero asymptotically with n. Similar notations apply for asymptotic inequalities, e.g. a n (n) ≥ b n , means that a n ≥ b n for sufficiently large n. P(E) For an arbitrary set A, we denote its complement by A c , and for A ⊆ R n , we denote its interior and closure by int(A) and cl(A) (with respect to the Euclidean metric), respectively. Whenever the range of the summation is not specified, this will mean summation over the entire support, e.g., u denotes u∈U , unless specified otherwise. Throughout this paper, the base of the logarithms is taken to be e. For a ∈ R, a + denotes max{0, a}. For two probability distributions P and Q defined on a common support X , P << Q will mean that P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q. 1(·) denotes the indicator function. Finally, O(·), o(·) and Ω(·) denotes the standard asymptotic notation of Big-O, Little-O and Big-Ω, respectively.
Encoder Detector
B. Problem formulation
Consider the HT setup illustrated in Fig. 1 , where (U n , V n , S n ) denote n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
copies of triplet of r.v.'s (U, V, S). The encoder (observer) observes U n and sends the message index
to the detector over an error-free channel using some encoding function (possibly stochastic) f (n) : U n → M. Given its own observation V n , the detector performs a HT on the joint distribution 1 of U n and V n with null hypothesis
and alternate hypothesis
Let H andĤ denote the r.v.'s corresponding to the true hypothesis and the output of the HT, respectively, with support The type I and type 2 error probability for an (f (n) , g (n) ) pair are defined as α f (n) , g (n) := P(Ĥ = 1|H = 0) = PĤ (1), andβ f (n) , g (n) := P(Ĥ = 0|H = 1) = QĤ (0), 1 Although a r.v. is specified together with its probability distribution, here, we abuse the notation for ease of exposition, and denote the observations at the observer and detector under both the null and alternate hypothesis by (U n , V n ), with probability distribution n i=1 P U V and n i=1 Q U V , respectively. This terminology is used throughout the paper. respectively, where
For a given type I error probability constraint , define the minimum type II error probability over all possible detectors as β f (n) , := inf
such thatᾱ f (n) , g (n) ≤ .
The performance of HT is measured by the error-exponent achieved by the test for a given constraint on the type I error probability, i.e., lim inf n→∞ − 1 n log β(f (n) , ) . Although the goal of the detector is to maximize the error-exponent achieved for the HT, it is also curious about the latent r.v. S n that is correlated with the source U n . S n is referred to as the private part of U n , which is distributed i.i.d. according to the joint distribution P SU V and Q SU V under the null and alternate hypothesis, respectively. It is desired to keep the private part as concealed as possible from the detector. We consider two measures of privacy for S n at the detector. The first is the equivocation defined as H(S n |M, V n ). The second one is the average distortion between S n and its reconstructionŜ n at the detector, measured according to an arbitrary bounded additive distortion metric d : S ×Ŝ → [0, D m ] with multi-letter distortion defined as
The goal is to ensure that the error-exponent for HT is maximized, while satisfying the constraints on the type I error probability and the privacy of S n . In the sequel, we study the trade-off between the rate, error-exponent (henceforth also referred to simply as the error exponent) and privacy achieved in the above setting. Before delving into that, a few definitions are in order. 
and for any γ > 0, there exists an n 0 ∈ Z + such that
whereŜ n = g (n)
r (M, V n ), and g (n) r
: [e nR ] × V n →Ŝ n denotes an arbitrary reconstruction map (possibly stochastic) at the detector. The rate-error exponent-distortion region R d ( ) is the closure of the set of all such achievable (R, κ, ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 ) tuples for a given .
Definition 2. For a given type I error probability constraint , a rate-error exponent-equivocation (R, κ, Λ 0 , Λ 1 ) tuple is achievable, if there exists a sequence of encoding and decoding functions f (n) : U n → M and g (n) : [e nR ] × V n →Ĥ such that (4) and (5) are satisfied, and for any γ > 0, there exists a n 0 ∈ Z + such that
The rate-error exponent-equivocation region R e ( ) is the closure of the set of all such achievable (R, κ, Λ 0 , Λ 1 ) tuples for a given .
Note that the privacy measures considered in (6) and (7) are stronger than
and lim inf
respectively. To see this for the equivocation privacy measure, note that if H(S n |M, V n , H = i) = nΛ * i − n a , i = 0, 1, for some a ∈ (0, 1), then an equivocation pair (Λ * 0 , Λ * 1 ) is achievable under the constraint given in (9), while it is not achievable under the constraint given in (7) .
C. Relation to Previous Work
Before stating our results, we briefly highlight the differences between our system model and the ones studied in [29] and [32] . In [29] , the observer applies a privacy mechanism to the data before releasing it to the transmitter, which performs further encoding prior to transmission to the detector. More specifically, the observer checks if U n ∈ T n [P U ] δ and if successful, sends the output of a memoryless privacy mechanism applied to U n , to the transmitter. Otherwise, it outputs a n-length zero-sequence.
The privacy mechanism plays the role of randomizing the data (or adding noise) in order to achieve the desired privacy. This model is similar in spirit to the earlier works in [27] and [28] , and the two stage encoding essentially results in a separation between the problem of coding for privacy and coding for compression. Similar privacy mechanisms that randomizes the data has also been used in other works that study utility-privacy trade-off like [51] . In our model, the tasks of coding for privacy and compression are done jointly (without a separate privacy mechanism) by utilizing all the available data samples U n . Also, while we consider the equivocation (and average distortion) between the revealed information and the private part as the privacy measure, in [29] , the mutual information between the observer's observations and the output of the memoryless mechanism is the privacy measure. Thus, for testing against independence in their model, a perfect privacy condition Λ 0 = 0 would imply that the error-exponent is also zero, since the output of the memoryless mechanism has to be independent of the observer's observations (under both hypotheses). However, as we show in Example 2 later, a positive error-exponent is achievable while guaranteeing perfect privacy in our model.
On the other hand, the difference between our model with equivocation as the privacy measure, and the security problem studied in [32] arises from the difference in the privacy constraint imposed. More specifically, while in [32] , the goal is to keep U n private from an illegitimate eavesdropper, the objective here is to keep a r.v. S n that is correlated with U n private from the detector. Moreover, we consider the stronger privacy constraint given in (7) as opposed to (9) which is considered in [32] . To satisfy this stronger privacy constraint on S n , we require that the aposteriori probability distribution of S n given the observations (M, V n ) at the detector is close in some sense to a desired "target" memoryless distribution. To achieve this, we use a novel stochastic encoding scheme to induce the necessary randomness for S n at the detector. Another difference is that the marginal distributions of U n and the side-information at the eavesdropper are assumed to be the same under the null and alternate hypotheses in [32] , which is not the case here.
Next, we state some supporting results that will be useful later for proving the main results.
D. Supporting Results
Let
denote the deterministic detector with acceptance region A n ⊆ [e nR ] × V n for H 0 and A c n for H 1 . Then, the type I and type II error probabilities are given bȳ
Lemma 3. Any error-exponent that is achievable is also achievable by a deterministic detector of the form given in (10) for some A n ⊆ [e nR ] × V n , where A n and A c n denote the acceptance regions for H 0 and H 1 , respectively.
The proof of Lemma 3 is given in Appendix A for completeness. Due to Lemma 3, henceforth we restrict our attention to deterministic g (n) . The next result shows that without loss of generality (w.l.o.g), it is also sufficient to consider g (n) r (in Definition 2) to be a deterministic function of the form
for the minimization in (6), whereφ i : M × V n →Ŝ, i ∈ [n], denotes an arbitrary deterministic function.
Lemma 4. The infimum in (6) is achieved by a deterministic function g (n) r as given in (13) , and hence it is sufficient to restrict our attention to such deterministic g (n)
r .
The proof of Lemma 4 is given in Appendix B. Next, we state some lemmas that will be handy for upper bounding the amount of privacy leakage in the proofs of the main results stated below. The following one is a well known result proved in [50] that upper bounds the difference in entropy of two r.v.'s (with a common support) in terms of the total variation distance between their probability distributions.
Definition 5. The total variation between probability distributions P X and Q X defined on the same support X is defined as
Lemma 6. [50, Lemma 2.7] Let P X and Q X be distributions defined on a common support X and let ρ := ||P X − Q X ||.
Then,
The next lemma will be handy in proving Theorem 8, Theorem 9, Proposition 14 and the counter-example for strong converse presented in Section V.
If P X = Q X , then for δ > 0 sufficiently small, there existsδ > 0 and n 0 (δ, |X |, |Y|) ∈ Z + such that for all n ≥ n 0 (δ, |X |, |Y|),
If P X = Q X , then for any δ > 0, there existsδ > 0 and n 0 (δ, |X |, |Y|) ∈ Z + such that for all n ≥ n 0 (δ, |X |, |Y|),
Also, for any δ > 0, there existsδ > 0 and n 0 (δ, |X |, |Y|) ∈ Z + such that for all n ≥ n 0 (δ, |X |, |Y|),
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix C.
In the next section, we establish an inner bound on R e ( ) and R d ( ).
III. MAIN RESULTS
The following two theorems are the main results of this paper providing inner bounds for R e ( ) and R d ( ), respectively.
where
Theorem 8 is the direct part or the achievability result in the parlance of information theory. Its proof will be given in Apppendix D along with the proof of Theorem 9 below. Notice that the rate-error exponent trade-off derived in [7] is recovered when the privacy constraint in Theorem 8 is relaxed. We next state an inner bound for R d ( ).
Theorem 9. For a given bounded additive distortion measure d(·, ·) and ∈ (0, 1), ,
and
are satisfied, where P SU V W and Q SU V W are as defined in Theorem 8.
While the rate-error exponent trade-off in Theorem 8 and Theorem 9 is the same as that achieved by the Shimokawa-Han-Amari (SHA) scheme [7] , the coding strategy is different due to the requirement of the privacy constraint. As mentioned above, in order to obtain a single-letter lower bound for the achievable distortion (and achievable equivocation) of the private part at the detector, it is required that the aposteriori probability distribution of S n given the observations (M, V n ) at the detector is close in some sense to a desired "target" memoryless distribution. For this purpose, we use stochastic encoding to induce the necessary randomness for S n at the detector. The coding scheme achieving this is inspired from [52] and to our knowledge has not been used before in the context of distributed HT. The analysis of the type I and type II error probabilities and the privacy achieved by our scheme is novel and involves the application of the well-known channel resolvability or soft-covering lemma [53] - [55] . Properties of the total variation distance between probability distributions mentioned in [45] play a key role in this analysis. The analysis also reveals the interesting fact that the coding schemes in Theorem 8 and Theorem 9, although quite different from the SHA scheme, achieves the same lower bound on the error-exponent.
Theorems 8 and 9 provide single-letter inner bounds on R d ( ) and R e ( ), respectively. A complete computable characterization of these regions would require a matching converse. This is a hard problem, since such a characterization is not available even for the distributed HT problem in general, without a privacy constraint (see [5] ). However, it is known that a single-letter characterization of the rate-error exponent region exists for the special case of TACI [11] . In the next section, we
show that TACI with a privacy constraint also admits a single-letter characterization, in addition to other optimality results.
IV. OPTIMALITY RESULTS FOR SPECIAL CASES
A. TACI with a Privacy Constraint
Assume that the detector observes two discrete memoryless sources Y n and Z n , i.e., V n = (Y n , Z n ). In TACI, the detector tests for the conditional independence of U and Y , given Z. Thus, the joint distribution of the r.v.'s under the null and alternate hypothesis are given by
respectively.
Let R e and R d denote the rate-error exponent-equivocation and rate-error exponent-distortion regions, respectively, for the case of vanishing type I error probability constraint, i.e., Assume that the privacy constraint under the alternate hypothesis is inactive. Thus, we are interested in characterizing the set
Note that Λ min and ∆ min correspond to the equivocation and average distortion of S n at the detector, respectively, when U n is available directly at the detector under the alternate hypothesis. The above assumption is motivated by scenarios, in which, the encoder is more eager to protect S n when there is a correlation between its own observation and that of the decoder. Consider the following example of user privacy in the context of online shopping, in which the encoder and detector correspond to a consumer and an online shopping portal, respectively. A consumer would like to share some information about his/her shopping behaviour, e.g., shopping history and preferences, with the shopping portal in order to get better deals and recommendations on relevant products. The shopping portal would like to determine whether the consumer belongs to its target age group (e.g., below 30 years old) before sending special offers to this customer. Assuming that the shopping patterns of the users within and outside the target age groups are independent, the shopping portal performs an independence test to check if the consumer's shared data is correlated with the data of its own customers. If the consumer is indeed within the target age group, the shopping portal would like to gather more information about this potential customer, particular interests, more accurate age estimation, etc.; while the user is reluctant to provide any further information. In this example, U n , S n and Y n corresponds to shopping behaviour, more information about the customer, and customers data available to the shopping portal, respectively.
For the above mentioned case, we have the following results.
Proposition 10. For the HT given in (26), (R, κ, Λ 0 , Λ min ) ∈ R e if and only if there exists an auxiliary r.v. W , such that
for some joint distribution of the form P SU Y ZW := P SU Y Z P W |U .
Proof: For TACI, the inner bound in Theorem 8 yields that for
Note that since (Y, Z, S) − U − W , we have
Let B := {P W |U : I P (U ; W |Z) ≤ R}. Then, for P W |U ∈ B , we have,
Hence,
By noting that Λ min ≤ H Q (S|W, Y, Z) (by the data processing inequality), we have shown that for (28)- (30) are satisfied. This completes the proof of achievability.
and independent of all the other r.v.'s
Then, for any γ > 0 and sufficiently large n, we have
Here, (39) follows since the sequences (U n , Z n ) are memoryless; (40) 
follows from the fact that T is independent of all the other r.v.'s.
The equivocation of source S n under the null hypothesis can be bounded as follows.
where P SU Y ZW = P SU Y Z P W |U for some conditional distribution P W |U .
Finally, we prove the upper bound on κ. For any encoding function f (n) and decision region A n ⊆ M × Y n × Z n for H 0 such that n → 0, we have,
Here, (44) follows from the log-sum inequality [50] . Thus,
where (45) follows since Q M Y n Z n = P M Z n P Y n |Z n . The last term can be single-letterized as follows:
Substituting (47) in (46), we obtain
Also, note that (Z, Y ) − U − W holds. This completes the proof of the converse and the theorem.
Next, we state the result for TACI with a distortion privacy constraint, where the distortion is measured using an arbitrary distortion measure d(·, ·). Let ∆ min := min φ(u,y,z) E Q [d (S, φ(U, Y, Z))].
Proposition 11. For the HT given in (26) 
for some P SU Y ZW as defined in Proposition 10.
Proof: The proof of achievability follows from Theorem 9, similarly to the way Proposition 10 is obtained from Theorem 
where, in (52) Converse: Let W = (W T , T ) denote the auxiliary r.v. defined in the converse of Proposition 10. Inequalities (49) and (50) follow similarly as obtained in Proposition 10. We prove (51) .
In (53), we used the fact that (96) holds for any arbitrary joint distribution on the r.v.'s (S n , U n , M, Y n , Z n ) in place of
This completes the proof of the converse and the theorem.
A more general version of Proposition 10 and Proposition 11 is claimed in [16] as Theorem 7 and Theorem 8, respectively, in which a privacy constraint under the alternate hypothesis is also imposed. However, we have identified a mistake in the converse proof; and hence, a single-letter characterization for this general problem remains open.
To complete the single-letter characterization in Proposition 10 and Proposition 11, we bound the alphabet size of the auxiliary r.v. W in the following lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix E.
Lemma 12. In Proposition 10 and 11, it suffices to consider auxiliary r.v.'s W such that |W| ≤ |U| + 2.
The proof of Lemma 12 uses standard arguments based on the Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory's theorem and is given in 
are satisfied for some P SU Y ZW as in Proposition 10.
The computation of the trade-off given in Proposition 10 is challenging in spite of the cardinality bound on the auxiliary r.v. W provided by Lemma 12, as closed form solutions do not exist in general. Below, we provide an example where such a solution does exist.
where, for a, b ∈ R, a * b := (1 − a) · b + (1 − b) · a, and h b : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is the binary entropy function given by 
On the other hand, if q = 0, note that S = U . Hence, the same constraints can be bounded as follows:
where, h In the next subsection, we establish the optimal error exponent-privacy trade-off for the special case of zero-rate compression.
This trade-off is independent of the type I error probability constraint ∈ (0, 1), and hence known as a strong converse result.
B. Zero-rate compression
Assume the following zero-rate constraint on the communication between the observer and the detector,
Note that (65) does not imply that |M| = 0, i.e., nothing can be transmitted, but that the message set cardinality can grow at most sub-exponentially in n. Such a scenario is motivated practically by low power or low bandwidth constrained applications in which communication is costly. Proposition 14 and Proposition 15 stated below provide an optimal single-letter characterization of R d ( ) and R e ( ) in this case. While the coding schemes in the achievability part of these results are inspired from that in [6] , the analysis of privacy achieved at the detector is new. Lemma 7 serves as a crucial tool for this purpose. We next state the results. Let
and ∆ max
where φ : V →Ŝ is a deterministic function and
Proof: First, we prove that (0, κ, ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 ) satisfying (67)-(69) is achievable. While the encoding and decoding scheme is the same as that in [6] , we mention it for the sake of completeness.
Encoding: The encoder sends the message
We analyze the type I and type II error probabilities for the above scheme. Note that for any δ > 0, the weak law of large numbers implies that
Hence, the type I error probability tends to zero, asymptotically. The type II error can be written as follows.
Next, we lower bound the average distortion for S n achieved by this scheme at the detector. Defining
and ρ (n)
we can write
where, (73) follows from Property 2(b) in [45] , and (74) follows from (17) . Similarly, it can be shown using (16) that if
On the other hand, if Q U = P U and δ is small enough, we have
Hence, we can write for δ small enough,
This completes the proof of the achievability.
We next prove the converse. Note that by the strong converse result in [8] , the R.H.S of (67) is an upper bound on the achievable error-exponent for all ∈ (0, 1) even without a privacy constraint (hence, also with a privacy constraint). Also,
Here, (79) follows from the fact that the detector can always reconstructŜ i as a function of V n . Similarly,
Hence, any achievable Λ 0 and Λ 1 has to satisfy (68) and (69), respectively. This completes the proof.
The following Proposition is the analogous result to Proposition 14 when the privacy measure is equivocation.
Proposition 15. For ∈ (0, 1), (0, κ, Λ 0 , Λ 1 ) ∈ R e ( ) if and only if it satisfies (67) and
Proof: For proving the achievablity part, the encoding and decoding scheme is the same as in Proposition 14. Hence, the analysis of the error-exponent given in Proposition 14 holds. To lower bound the equivocation of S n at the detector, defining 
where, (82) follows due to Lemma 6, [50, Lemma 2.12] and the fact that entropy of a r.v. is bounded by the logarithm of cardinality of its support; and, (83) follows from (17) in Lemma 7 since δ > 0. In a similar way, it can be shown using (16) that if Q U = P U , then
On the other hand, if Q U = P U and δ is small enough, we can write,
where (85) follows from Lemma 6 and (76). It follows from (15) in Lemma 7 that for δ > 0 sufficiently small, ρ The converse trivially follows from the results in [6] and [8] that the R.H.S of (67) is the optimal error-exponent achievable for all values of ∈ (0, 1) even when there is no privacy constraint, and the following inequality H(S n |M, V n , H = j) ≤ H(S n |V n , H = j), j = 0, 1.
This concludes the proof of the Proposition.
In Section II-B, we mentioned that it is possible to achieve a positive error-exponent with perfect privacy in our model. Here, we provide an example of TAI with an equivocation privacy constraint under both hypothesis, and show that perfect privacy is possible. Recall that TAI is a special case of TACI, in which, Z = constant, and hence, the null and alternate hypothesis are given by
Example 2. Let S = U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, Y = {0, 1},
. Then, we have H Q (S|Y ) = H P (S) = H P (U ) = 2 bits. Also, noting that under the null hypothesis, Y = U mod 2, H P (S|Y ) = 2 bits. It follows from the inner bound given by equations (31)- (34) , and, (37) and (38) that (R, κ, Λ 0 , Λ 1 ) ∈ R e ( ), ∈ (0, 1) if
where P SU Y W := P SU Y P W |U and Q SU Y W := Q SU Y P W |U for some conditional distribution P W |U . If we set W := U mod 2, 
V. A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO THE STRONG CONVERSE
Ahlswede and Csiszár obtained a strong converse result for the distributed HT problem without a privacy constraint in [5] , where they showed that for any positive rate R, the optimal achievable error-exponent is independent of the type I error probability constraint . Here, we explore whether a similar result holds in our model, in which, an additional privacy constraint is imposed. We will show through a counterexample that this is not the case in general. The basic idea used in the counterexample is a "time-sharing" argument which is used to construct from a given coding scheme that achieves the optimal rate-error-exponent-equivocation trade-off under a vanishing type I error probability constraint, a new coding scheme that satisfies the given type I error probability constraint * and the same error-exponent as before, yet achieves a higher equivocation for S n at the detector. This concept has been used previously in other contexts, e.g., in the characterization of the first-order maximal channel coding rate of additive white gaussian noise (AWGN) channel in the finite block-length regime [57] , and subsequently in the characterization of the second order maximal coding rate in the same setting [58] . However, we will provide a self-contained proof of the counterexample by utilizing Lemma 7 for this purpose.
Assume that the joint distribution P SU V is such that H P (S|U, V ) < H P (S|V ). Proving the strong converse amounts to showing that any (R, κ, Λ 0 , Λ 1 ) ∈ R e ( ) for some ∈ (0, 1) also belongs to R e . Consider TAI problem with an equivocation privacy constraint, in which, R ≥ H P (U ) and Λ 1 ≤ Λ min . Then, from the optimal single-letter characterization of R e given in Proposition 10, it follows by taking W = U that (H P (U ), I P (V ; U ), H P (S|V, U ), Λ min ) ∈ R e . Note that I P (V ; U ) is the maximum error-exponent achievable for any type I error probability constraint ∈ (0, 1), even when U n is observed directly at the detector. Thus, for vanishing type I error probability constraint → 0 and κ = I P (V ; U ), the term H P (S|V, U ) denotes the maximum achievable equivocation for S n under the null hypothesis. From the proof of Proposition 10, it follows that the coding scheme for achieving this tuple is as follows.
The type I error probability of the above scheme tends to zero asymptotically with n. Now, for a fixed * > 0, consider a modification of this coding scheme as follows.
where j is the index of u n in C U , and with probability * ,
It is easy to see that for this modified coding scheme, the type I error probability is asymptotically equal to * , while the error-exponent remains the same as I(V ; U ) since the probability of declaringĤ = 0 is decreased. Recalling that I U (u n , δ) := 
where, {γ n } n∈Z + denotes some sequence of positive numbers such that γ n (n) − − → 0,
γ n := γ n n H(S n |M = 0, V n , , H = 0, I U (U n , δ) = 1)
Equation (87) follows similarly to the proof of Theorem 1 in [59] . Equation (88) is obtained as follows.
1 n H (S n |M = 0, V n , H = 0, I U (U n , δ = 0))
Here, (93) is obtained by an application of Lemma 6; and (94) is due to the assumption that H P (S|U, V ) < H P (S|V ).
It follows from Lemma 7 that ρ * n (n) − − → 0, which in turn implies that
From (91), (92) and (95), we have thatγ n
for some Λ * 0 > H P (S|U, V ). Since (H P (U ), I P (V ; U ), Λ * 0 , Λ min ) / ∈ R e , this implies that in general, the strong converse does not hold for HT with an equivocation privacy constraint. The same counterexample can be used in a similar manner to show that the strong converse does not hold for HT with an average distortion privacy constraint either.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the distributed HT problem with a privacy constraint, with equivocation and average distortion as the measures of privacy. We have established a single-letter inner bound on the rate-error exponent-equivocation and rate-error exponent-distortion trade-offs. We have also obtained the optimal rate-error exponent-equivocation and rate-error exponentdistortion trade-offs for two special cases, when the communication rate over the channel is zero, and for TACI under a privacy constraint. It is interesting to note that the strong converse for distributed HT does not hold when there is an additional privacy constraint in the system. Thus, the problem studied here provides a counterexample to the folklore that strong converses hold for all memoryless systems. Extending these results to the case when the communication between the observer and detector takes place over a noisy communication channel is an interesting avenue for future research.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Note that for a stochastic detector, the type I and type II error probabilities are linear functions of PĤ |M,V n . As a result, for each fixed n and f (n) ,ᾱ f (n) , g (n) andβ f (n) , g (n) for a stochastic detector g (n) can be thought of as the type I and type II errors achieved by "time sharing" among a finite number of deterministic detectors. To see this, consider some ordering on the elements of the set M × V n and let ν i := PĤ |M,V n (0|i), i ∈ [1 : N ], where i denotes the i th element of M × V n and N = |M × V n |. Then, we can write
Then, it is easy to see that PĤ |M,V n = n i=1 ν i I i , where I i := [e i 1 − e i ] and e i is an N length vector with 1 at the i th component and 0 elsewhere. Now, suppose (ᾱ S n U n V n M denote the joint distribution of the r.v.'s (S n , U n , V n , M ) under hypothesis H j , j = 0, 1, andPŜ n |M,V n denote an arbitrary stochastic function for g (n)
r . Then, we have
where,
Continuing, we have
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 7
We will first prove (15) . Fix δ > 0. For γ > 0, define the following sets:
Then, we can write
Next, note that
for sufficiently large n (depending on |X |), since Q(I X (X n , δ) = 1) (n) − − → 1. Thus, for n large enough,
We can bound the term in (97) as follows.
Let PỸ denote the type of y n and define
Then, for y n ∈ T n [Q Y ]γ , arbitraryγ > 0 and n sufficiently large (depending on |X |, |Y|, δ, γ), it follows from [50, Lemma 2.6] that Q I X (X n ,δ)|Y n (1|y n ) ≥ 1 − e −n(E (n) (δ,γ)−γ) , and Q(I X (X n , δ) = 1) ≥ 1 − e −n(D(P X ||Q X )−γ) .
From (97), (99) and (100), it follows that
We next show that E (n) (δ, γ) > 0 for sufficiently small δ > 0 and γ > 0. This would imply that the R.H.S of (101) converges exponentially to zero (forγ small enough) with exponentδ := min Ω(γ), E (n) (δ, γ) −γ, D(P X ||Q X ) −γ , thus proving (15) . We can write, Here, (102) follows due to the convexity of KL divergence (103) is due to Pinsker's inequality [50] . We also have from the triangle inequality satisfied by total variation that,
Since P X = Q X , E (n) (δ, γ) > 0 for sufficiently small γ > 0 and δ > 0. This completes the proof of (15) .
We next prove (17) . Similar to (97) and (98), we have,
since P (I X (X n , δ) = 0) (n) − − → 1. Also, for γ < δ |Y| and sufficiently large n (depending on δ, γ, |X |, |Y|), we have
where, to obtain (106), we used
and P I X (X n ,δ)|Y n (0|y n ) ≥ 1 − e −nΩ(δ−γ|Y|) , for y n ∈ B δ 0,γ and γ < δ |Y| .
Here, (108) follows from Lemma 2.12, and (109) follows from Lemma 2.10 and Lemma 2.12, in [50] , respectively. Thus, from (104), (105) and (107), we can write that,
This completes the proof of (17) . The proof of (16) is exactly the same as (17) , with the only difference that the sets B δ We first describe the encoding and decoding operations which is the same for both Theorem 8 and Theorem 9. Encoding: For a given codebook C n , define a conditional probability distribution
.
(110)
n > R, the encoder performs uniform random binning on the sequences w n (k), k ∈ [M n ] in C n , i.e., for each codeword in C n , it selects an index uniformly at random from the set e n(R− |U ||W| log(n+1) n ) . Denote the bin assignment by C n B and the bin index selected for w n (k) by f B (k). If the observed sequence U n = u n is typical, i.e., Decoding: If M = 0 or t / ∈ T n [P U W ] δ ,Ĥ = 1 is declared. Else, given M = (t, m ) and V n = v n , the detector looks for a typical sequenceŵ n := w n (ĵ) ∈ T n [P W ]δ , in the codebook C n such that
H e (w n (l)|v n ), if I P (U ; W ) + µ + 1 n |U||W| log(n + 1) > R, j = j, otherwise.
Denote the above decoding rule by P ED (m, v n ).
We next analyze the average of the type I and type II error probabilities achieved by the above scheme averaged over the random ensemble of codebooks C n and C n B .
Analysis of Type I error:
The system induced distribution when H = 0 is given bỹ
Consider two auxiliary distributionΨ and Ψ defined as
and Ψ (0) (s n , u n , v n , j, w n , m,ĵ,ŵ n )
Note that the distributionsP (0) , Ψ (0) andΨ (0) defined are r.v.'s, and depend on the codebook realizations C n and C n B . Also, observe that the stochastic encoder is chosen such that P Eu (j|u n , C n ) = Ψ (0) (j|u n ) and hence, the only difference between the joint distribution Ψ (0) andΨ (0) is the marginal distribution of U n . By the soft-covering lemma [53] [55] , it follows that for some γ 1 > 0,
Hence, from (115) and Property 2(d) [45] ), we have
where the distributions Ψ (0) andΨ (0) are over the r.v.'s given in (113) . Also, note that the only difference between the
Since
it follows that
Equations (116) and (118) together imply via Property 2(c) [45] that
This means that for large n, the system distributionP (0) induced by encoding and decoding operations (when H 0 is the true hypothesis) can be approximated by that under Ψ (0) . LetP (1) andΨ ( 
Also, since I P (U ; W ) + µ > 0, by the application of soft-covering lemma,
for some γ 3 > 0.
If Q U = P U , then it again follows from the soft-covering lemma that
thereby implying that
where the distributions Ψ (1) andΨ (1) are over the r.v.'s given in (113). Also, note that the only difference between the
Eqns. (123) and (124) together imply that
This means that for large n, the system distributionP (1) induced by encoding and decoding operations when H 1 is the true hypothesis can be approximated by that under Ψ (1) .
Also, from (114), (119) and (121) and the weak law of large numbers,
A type I error occurs only if one of the following events happen:
. − − → 0. Also, as in the proof of Theorem 2 in [13] , it follows that
where δ 
Analysis of Type II error:
Note that a type II error occurs only if V n ∈ T n [P V ] δ , δ = |W|δ, and M = 0, i.e., U n ∈ T n
we can restrict the type II error analysis to only such (U n , V n ). Denote the event that a type II error happens by D 0 . The type II error probability can be written as β(f (n) , ) = (u n ,v n )∈ U n ×V n P(U n = u n , V n = v n |H = 1) P(D 0 |U n = u n , V n = v n , H = 1).
The last term in (128) can be upper bounded as follows.
P(D 0 |U n = u n , V n = v n , H = 1) = P(E N E |U n = u n , V n = v n , H = 1) P(D 0 |U n = u n , V n = v n , E N E , H = 1)
By averaging over all codebooks C n , C n B and using the symmetry of the codebook generation, encoding and decoding procedure, we can write,
The first term in (129) can upper bounded as
To obtain (130), we used the fact that P Eu (1|u n , C n ) in (110) is invariant to the joint type T PŨW of (U n , W n (1)) = (u n , w n ) (keeping all the other codewords fixed), which in turn implies that given E N E and the type PŨ of U n = u n , each sequence in the conditional type T PW |Ũ is equally likely (in the randomness induced by the random codebook generation and stochastic encoding in (110)) and its probability is upper bounded by 1 |T PW |Ũ | . Defining the events
the last term in (129) can be written as
The analysis of the terms in (135) is essentially similar to that given in the proof of Theorem 2 in [13] , except for a subtle difference that we mention next. In order to bound the binning error event E BE , we require a bound similar to P (W n (l) =w n |F) ≤ 2 P(W n (l) =w n ), ∀w n ∈ W n ,
that is used in the proof of Theorem 2 in [13] . Note that the stochastic encoding scheme considered here is different from the one in [13] . In place of (136), we will show that for l = 1, P(W n (l) =w n | F) ≤ (1 + o(1)) P(W n (l) =w n ).
We can write P(W n (l) =w n |F) = P(W n (l) =w n |U n = u n , V n = v n ) P(W n (1) = w n |W n (l) =w n , U n = u n , V n = v n ) P(W n (1) = w n |U n = u n , V n = v n ) P(J = 1|W n (1) = w n , W n (l) =w n , U n = u n , V n = v n ) P(J = 1|W n (1) = w n , U n = u n , V n = v n ) (137)
Since the codewords are generated independently of each other and the binning operation is done independent of the codebook generation, we have P(W n (1) = w n |W n (l) =w n , U n = u n , V n = v n ) = P(W n (1) = w n |U n = u n , V n = v n ),
and P(f B (J) = 1|J = 1, W n (1) = w n , W n (l) =w n , U n = u n , V n = v n )
= P(f B (J) = 1|J = 1, W n (1) = w n , U n = u n , V n = v n ).
Also, note that P(E N E |f B (J) = 1, J = 1, W n (1) = w n , W n (l) =w n , U n = u n , V n = v n ) = P(E N E |f B (J) = 1, J = 1, W n (1) = w n , U n = u n , V n = v n ).
Next, consider the term in (137). Let F := {W n (1) = w n , U n = u n , V n = v n } F := {W n (1) = w n , W n (l) =w n , U n = u n , V n = v n } C n l := C n \{W n (1)} and C n 1,l := C n \{W n (1), W n (l)}.
Then, the numerator and denominator of (137) can be written as,
respectively. Note that C n 1 and C n 1,l consists of codewords that are distributed i.i.d. according to n i=1 P W given F and F , respectively. The R.H.S. of (139) (resp. (140)) denote the average probability that J = 1 is chosen by the stochastic encoder P Eu given W n (1) = w n , U n = u n and M n − 2 (resp. M n − 1) other independent codewords in the codebook. Note that for W n (j) = w n (j),
where PŨW j denote the joint type of (u n , w n (j)). Since each term of the form above is exponentially decreasing in n, it follows that the term inside the square braces in (139) and (140) differ (significantly) asymptotically only if the event
occurs, and being probabilities, the difference is atmost 1. Since the probability of the event E l max decreases as 2 −e n(I P (U ;W )+µ)
with n , we have that 
where the final inequality in (143) follows since the term within the expectation which is exponential in order dominates the double exponential term 2 −e n(I P (U ;W )+µ) . The analysis of the other terms in (135) is the same as in the SHA scheme in [7] , and results in the error-exponent (within a additive O(δ) term) claimed in the Theorem. We refer the reader to [13, Theorem 2] for a detailed proof 4 . By the random coding argument followed by the standard expurgation technique [60] (also see [13, Proof of Theorem 2]), there exists a deterministic codebook pair (C n , C n B ) such that the type I and type II error probabilities are within a constant multiplicative factor of their average values over the random ensemble, and
and n i=1 P W − Ψ (l) wi (J) ≤ e −γ5n l = 0, 1,
where γ 4 and γ 5 are some positive numbers. Since the average type I error probability for our scheme tends to zero asymptotically, and the error-exponent is unaffected by a constant multiplicative scaling of the type II error probability, this codebook achieves the same type I error probability and error-exponent as the average over the random ensemble. Using this deterministic codebook for encoding and decoding, we first lower bound the equivocation and average distortion of S n at the detector as follows:
First consider the equivocation of S n under the null hypothesis. 
≥ (1 − e −nΩ(δ) ) H Ψ (0) (S n |w n (J), V n ) − 2e −γ4n log |S| n |V| n e −γ4n (151) SV |W , i ∈ [n]. If Q U = P U , it follows similarly to above that H(S n |M, V n , H = 1) ≥ (1 − e −nΩ(δ) ) H Ψ (1) (S n |w n (J), V n ) − 2e −γ4n log |S| n |V| n e −γ4n (156)
= nH Q (S|W, V ) − o(1).
Finally, consider the case H = 1 and Q U = P U . We have for δ small enough that,
Hence, for δ small enough, we can write H(S n |M, V n , H = 1) ≥ H(S n |M, V n , I U (U n , δ ), H = 1) Thus, since δ > 0 is arbitrary, we have shown that for ∈ (0, 1), (R, κ, Λ 0 , Λ 1 ) ∈ R s e ( ) if (18)-(21) holds.
On the other hand, average distortion of S n at the detector can be lower bounded under H = 0 as follows: SV |W , i ∈ [n]. Next, consider that the alternate hypothesis holds and that Q U = P U . Then, similarly to above, we can write 
If Q U = P U , we have min g (n) r E d S n ,Ŝ n |H = 1 ≥ P (M = 0|H = 1) min
EP (1) [d (S i , φ i (0, V n ))]
≥ P (M = 0|H = 1) min
Here, (175) follows from (15) in Lemma 7 and (176) follows from (161). Thus, since δ > 0 is arbitrary, we have shown that (R, κ, ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 ) ∈ R d ( ), ∈ (0, 1), provided that (18), (19) , (24) and (25) .
Thus, by the Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory's theorem [56] , it is sufficient to have at most |U| − 1 points in the support of W to preserve P U and three more to preserve H P (U |W, Z), H P (Y |W, Z) and H P (S|W, Z, Y ). Noting that H P (Y |Z) and 
where, g 4 (w, P W |U ) = s,u,y,z P U |W (u|w)P Y ZS|U (y, z, s|u) d(s, φ(w, y, z)),
similar result holds also for the case of R d .
